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Abstract		
In	theory,	there	is	no	hierarchy	of	rights	in	the	Equality	Act	2010:	equal	weight	is	given	to	
each	protected	characteristic.	At	least	two,	very	different,	critiques	though	have	been	made	
of	 this	 argument	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 religion	 or	 belief.	 One	 argument	 is	 that	 religious	
discrimination	 has	 unfairly	 been	 given	 a	 lower	 priority	 than	 other	 characteristics,	
particularly	 sexual	 orientation.	 The	 second	 is	 that	 religion	 is	 inherently	 different,	 partly	
because	religions	tend	to	set	extensive,	and	possibly	discriminatory,	rules	for	behaviour.	In	
order	 to	keep	religion	or	belief	 claims	within	a	 reasonable	 limit,	 religious	discrimination	
claims	must	therefore	be	confined.	The	perceived	danger	of	confining	these	claims	though	
is	 that,	 because	 of	 the	 insistence	 that	 there	 is	 no	 hierarchy	 of	 rights,	 this	 will	 lead	 to	
reduced	 protection	 across	 all	 the	 protected	 characteristics	 since	 concepts	 which	 apply	
across	the	Equality	Act	will	be	reinterpreted	in	order	to	avoid	unwanted	results.	As	will	be	
demonstrated	though,	both	of	these	arguments	are	misconceived.		
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Introduction		The	Equality	Act	2010	was	designed	to	unify	and	simplify	discrimination	law,	gathering	together	 the	 various	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 dealing	with	 each	 ground	 of	 discrimination,	and	 creating	 one	 overall	 scheme.	Whilst	 there	 are	 some	 differences	 in	 the	 provisions	relating	 to	 the	 various	 protected	 characteristics,	 the	 Act	 in	 theory	 does	 not	 have	 a	hierarchy	 of	 rights.	 Leaving	 aside	 the	more	 extensive	 provisions	 relating	 to	 disability	due	to	its	specific	nature,	each	right	is	given	the	same	degree	of	protection,	although	the	provisions	 relating	 to	 each	 are	 not	 identical.	 However,	 this	 theoretical	 equivalency	between	 each	 ground	 has,	 it	 has	 been	 argued,	 been	 challenged	 by	 the	 inclusion	 of	religion	or	belief	as	a	protected	characteristic.			Two	very	different	 critiques	of	 this	 formal	non-hierarchy	have	been	made.	The	 first	 is	that	a	hierarchy	does	in	fact	exist	since	religious	discrimination	has	unfairly	been	given	a	 lower	 priority	 than	 other	 characteristics,	 particularly	 sexual	 orientation,	 as	 can	 be	seen	 from	 cases	where	 there	 is	 a	 clash	 of	 rights	 (see	 eg	 Carey	 and	 Carey,	 2012).	 The	second	 argument	 has	 a	 very	 different	 starting	 point:	 religion	 or	 belief	 is	 inherently	different	from	other	protected	characteristics,	perhaps	because	it	is	a	choice	rather	than	an	 inherent	 characteristic	 of	 an	 individual,	 and	 certainly	 because	 religions	 or	 beliefs	place	 extensive	 obligations	 for	 behaviour	 on	 their	 adherents	 (see	 eg	 McColgan	 2009,	2014;	Pitt,	2010).	In	particular,	these	obligations	may	require	believers	to	discriminate	against	others.	Thus	 its	 inclusion	may	 inhibit	 rather	 than	progress	efforts	 to	eradicate	discrimination,	particularly,	although	not	exclusively,	sexual	orientation	discrimination.	As	 a	 result,	 religious	 claims	must	 be	 confined.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 established	 concepts	such	as	the	distinction	between	direct	and	indirect	discrimination	will	be	reinterpreted	in	 order	 to	 avoid	 unwanted	 results.	 However,	 this	 will,	 so	 the	 argument	 goes,	 create	problems	because	of	the	insistence	that	there	is	no	hierarchy	of	rights.	Decisions	made	in	the	context	of	religious	claims	will	have	an	effect	more	broadly	because	such	concepts	apply	across	all	the	protected	characteristics.	Including	religion	and	belief,	 it	 is	argued,	will	 therefore	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 anti-discrimination	 rights	 as	 a	whole.	 This	article	will,	 however,	 challenge	 both	 of	 these	 critiques	 and	 argue	 that	 these	 fears	 are	unfounded.				
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Is	religion	treated	less	favourably	than	other	rights?		Many	of	the	claims	that	religion	is	treated	less	favourably	than	other	rights	refer	to	the	specific	context	of	the	conflict	between	religious	and	sexual	orientation	discrimination.	(Ahdar	and	Leigh,	2013;	Hambler,	2012;	Rivers,	2007).	There	have	been	several	 cases	where	 employees	 or	 service	 providers	 have	 argued	 they	 should	 be	 exempted	 from	having	 to	 perform	 certain	 duties	 because	 of	 their	 religious	 beliefs.	 They	 have	 almost	uniformly	 though	been	unsuccessful.	Most	of	 these	cases	predate	 the	Equality	Act,	but	the	 provisions	 they	 interpret,	 which	 were	 contained	 in	 the	 Employment	 Equality	(Religion	 or	 Belief)	 Regulations	 2003,	 the	 Employment	 Equality	 (Sexual	 Orientation)	Regulations	 2003	 and	 the	 Equality	 Act	 (Sexual	 Orientation)	 Regulations	 2007,	 are	almost	 identical	 to	 those	 in	 the	 Act	 and	 the	 results	would	 not	 be	 different	 under	 the	newer	legislation.			The	 first	 significant	 case	 to	 consider	 this	 clash	 of	 rights	 was	 Ladele	 v	 Islington	 LBC	([2010]	1	WLR	955)	where	a	registrar	refused	to	perform	civil	partnerships	because	of	her	 religious	 beliefs	 that	marriage	 should	 only	 be	 between	 a	man	 and	 a	woman.	 She	ultimately	 failed	 in	 her	 claim	 that	 her	 employer’s	 refusal	 to	 accommodate	 her 1	amounted	to	direct	and	indirect	discrimination	on	the	grounds	of	religion.	Although	her	claim	 of	 direct	 discrimination	 was	 successful	 at	 first	 instance,	 this	 conclusion	 was	erroneous	 and	 was	 rejected	 by	 the	 Employment	 Appeal	 Tribunal	 (EAT).	 Direct	discrimination	requires	less	favourable	treatment	because	of	a	protected	characteristic.2	Any	 person	 who	 refused	 to	 perform	 civil	 partnerships	 would	 have	 been	 subject	 to	disciplinary	 action,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 this	 was	 for	 a	 religious	 reason	 or	 not.	 Her	claim	of	indirect	discrimination,	which	was	again	successful	at	first	instance	but	failed	at	the	 EAT	 and	 Court	 of	 Appeal,	 was	 rejected.	While	 it	 was	 agreed	 that	 the	 council	 had	applied	a	provision,	criterion	or	practice	which	put	people	of	Ladele’s	religion	or	belief	at	 a	 disadvantage	 compared	 to	 others,	 Islington	 could	 demonstrate	 that	 it	 was	 a	proportionate	means	of	achieving	a	legitimate	aim	to	require	her	to	provide	its	services	in	a	non-discriminatory	way	in	line	with	its	equality	policies.3	Similarly,	 in	McFarlane	v	
Relate	 ([2010]	 EWCA	 Civ	 880)	 a	 relationship	 counsellor	 refused	 to	 provide	 psycho-sexual	 counselling	 to	 same-sex	 couples	 and	his	 employer	 refused	 to	permit	 him	 to	do	this.	He	too	was	unsuccessful	in	his	indirect	religious	claim	because	it	was	proportionate	for	Relate	to	require	non-discrimination	in	line	with	its	ethos	and	Code	of	Ethics.	
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	Religious	 defences	 made	 to	 claims	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 discrimination	 within	 the	context	of	the	provision	of	services	have	also	failed.	In	Bull	v	Hall	([2013]	1	WLR	3741)	and	 Black	 v	Wilkinson	 ([2013]	 1	WLR	 2490)	 it	 was	 held	 that	 the	 owners	 of	 bed	 and	breakfast	 accommodation	 had	 directly	 discriminated	 against	 gay	 couples	 by,	 in	 Bull	refusing	them	double-bedded	accommodation,	and	in	Black	refusing	to	allow	the	couple	to	share	a	room	at	all,	because	the	owners	would	only	allow	married	couples	to	do	so.4	In	both	cases	it	was	held	that	there	was	no	defence	to	the	claim	of	direct	discrimination	either	 within	 the	 Equality	 Act	 or	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Art	 9	 ECHR.	 In	 a	 different	 context,	litigation	brought	by	a	Catholic	adoption	charity,	Catholic	Care,5	claiming	that	 it	should	be	permitted	to	refuse	to	accept	gay	couples	as	potential	adopters	in	its	adoption	service	was	 also	 unsuccessful.	While	 it	 argued	 that	 it	would	 have	 to	 close	 as	 a	 result	 since	 it	would	no	 longer	be	able	 to	provide	 the	service	 in	accordance	with	 its	Catholic	beliefs,	this	was	not	considered	to	be	sufficient	justification	to	allow	it	to	discriminate.		Some	 religious	 claims	 made	 within	 the	 entirely	 religious	 sphere	 have	 also	 failed.6	In	
Reaney	 v	 Hereford	 Diocesan	 Board	 of	 Finance,	 ((2007)	 ET	 1602844/2006)	 Reaney	applied	 for	 the	post	 of	Diocesan	Youth	Officer,	 but	was	 rejected	because	 of	 his	 sexual	orientation.	 The	 Diocese	 argued	 that	 the	 post	 fell	 within	 the	 ‘organised	 religion’	exception	 in	 the	 Equality	 Act	 2010.7	This	 allows	 an	 employer	 to	 discriminate	 if	 the	employment	 is	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 an	 organised	 religion	 and	 the	 discriminatory	requirement	 is	 applied	 either	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 doctrines	 of	 the	 religion	 (the	‘compliance	principle’),	or	to	avoid	conflict	with	the	strongly	held	religious	convictions	of	a	significant	number	of	the	religion’s	followers	(the	‘non-conflict	principle’).	However,	while	 the	 Tribunal	 agreed	 that	 the	 post	 was	 one	 of	 the	 small	 number	 of	 non-clergy	positions	which	was	for	the	purposes	of	an	organised	religion,	it	held	that	the	Diocese’s	actions	 did	 not	 fall	 within	 either	 the	 compliance	 or	 the	 non-	 conflict	 principle	 since	Reaney	 had	 said	 that	 he	 would	 remain	 celibate	 and	 therefore	 complied	 with	 the	religion’s	teachings.	The	discrimination	was	thus	illegal	and	Reaney	won	his	claim.			While	 such	 religious	 claims	 have	 been	 unsuccessful,	 only	 in	 a	 very	 limited	 sense	however,	 do	 these	 cases	 show	 that	 religion	 is	 placed	 under	 sexual	 orientation	 in	 any	strict	hierarchical	sense.	There	are	numerous	explanations	for	these	cases	which	do	not	rest	 on	 the	 automatic	 trumping	 of	 one	 right	 above	 another.	 Since	 these	 are	 complex	
	 5	
matters	 on	 which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 have	 a	 range	 of	 opinions,	 I	 will	 not	 discuss	 the	particular	 merits	 or	 the	 appropriate	 balance	 of	 rights	 in	 each	 of	 these	 decisions	 but	rather	 consider	 what,	 taken	 as	 a	 whole,	 they	 demonstrate.	 Of	 course	merely	 because	there	 is	no	hierarchy	of	 rights	does	not	mean	 that	 the	decisions	are	unproblematic	or	even	necessarily	that	the	results	reached	were	correct.			In	 considering	 possible	 explanations	 for	 these	 cases,	 it	 is	 firstly	 necessary	 to	 bear	 in	mind	the	forms	of	discrimination	in	issue	and	particularly	the	distinction	between	direct	and	 indirect	 discrimination.	 While	 cases	 such	 as	 Ladele	 and	McFarlane	 undoubtedly	state	 that	 it	 is	not	 indirect	discrimination	to	prohibit	direct	discrimination,	 this	can	be	explained	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 preventing	 direct	 discrimination	 (here	 on	 the	 ground	 of	sexual	orientation)	is	given	a	greater	priority	than	indirect	discrimination	(here	on	the	ground	of	 religion	or	belief).	This	conclusion	 is	understandable	given	 the	 insistence	 in	English	 law	 that	 direct	 discrimination	 cannot	 be	 justified	 unless	 a	 specific	 exemption	applies	 but	 indirect	 discrimination	 can	 be.	 These	 cases	 therefore	 demonstrate	 a	hierarchy	 of	 different	 types	 of	 discrimination,	 but	 do	 not	 necessarily	 demonstrate	 a	hierarchy	between	different	protected	characteristics.			Secondly,	 the	 courts	 may	 have	 decided	 these	 cases	 against	 the	 religious	 actors	 not	because	 the	 courts	 undervalue	 religion,	 but	 because	 of	 the	 courts’	 perception	 of	 their	institutional	 limitations	 and	 deference	 towards	 the	 detailed	 statutory	 scheme	 in	 the	Equality	 Act	 2010	 and	 in	 preceding	 legislation,	 particularly	 given	 the	 highly	controversial	and	sensitive	context	in	which	these	cases	arise.	Again	this	does	not	mean	these	 decisions	 are	 necessarily	 justifiable,	 but	 it	 goes	 some	 way	 to	 explaining	 them.	Particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 Catholic	 Care,	 there	 had	 been	 considerable	 public	 and	legislative	debate	as	to	whether	religious	adoption	agencies	should	have	an	exemption.	It	was	decided	that	there	should	only	be	a	temporary	exemption,	lasting	until	the	end	of	2008.8	Similarly,	there	had	been	considerable	Parliamentary	debate	about	the	rights	of	bed	and	breakfast	owners,	 (Cobb,	2009)	but	 a	 specific	 exemption	was	not	 included	 in	the	legislation.			Furthermore,	 while	 the	 courts	 have	 denied	 a	 right	 to	 discriminate	within	 the	 secular	context,	 the	 Equality	 Act	 gives	 numerous	 rights	 to	 religious	 organisations	 to	discriminate	on	 the	basis	of	sexual	orientation	and	other	grounds,	although	the	courts	
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have	rejected	claims	seeking	to	extend	these	exemptions,	as	Catholic	Care	demonstrates.	These	exemptions	are	in	addition	to	those	available	to	all	employers	and	organisations.	In	employment,	 in	addition	to	the	usual	genuine	occupational	requirement	exemption9	there	 is	an	exemption	allowing	sex,	 sexual	orientation,	marital	 status	and	 transgender	discrimination	where	 the	 employment	 is	 for	 the	purposes	 of	 an	 organised	 religion,	 as	described	 above.	 There	 is	 also	 an	 exemption	 allowing	 religious	 discrimination	 in	employment	where	the	organisation	has	a	religious	ethos,	although	it	is	unclear	whether	this	 adds	 anything	 to	 the	 standard	 genuine	 occupational	 requirement	 exemption.10	In	addition,	organisations	relating	to	religion	or	belief	may	also	impose	restrictions	on	the	provision	of	services11	if	this	is	applied	in	order	to	comply	with	the	compliance	or	non-conflict	principle	as	detailed	above,	as	long	as	the	service	is	not	provided	on	behalf	of	a	public	 authority	 or	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 a	 contract	 between	 the	 organisations	 and	 the	public	authority.		A	 religious	 organisation	 can	 therefore	 implement	 its	 discriminatory	 beliefs	 in	 some	contexts	 and	 is	 not	 required	 to	 accept	 the	 state’s	 conception	 of	 equality.	 If	 all	 that	 is	needed	for	there	to	be	a	hierarchy	of	rights	is	that	one	right	‘wins’	against	another	in	a	particular	 context,	 given	 the	 existence	 of	 these	 exemptions,	 then	 it	 could	 as	 easily	 be	argued	 that	 religion	 trumps	 sexual	 orientation	 discrimination	 (see	 Johnson	 and	Vanderbeck,	2014).	In	the	same	way	though	as	cases	such	as	Ladele	do	not	necessarily	show	 the	 trumping	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 above	 religion,	 these	 exemptions	 do	 not	necessarily	 demonstrate	 the	 converse	 hierarchy	 of	 rights.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	 see	 the	Equality	Act	scheme	as	a	whole:	in	some	cases	religious	concerns	will	be	predominant,	in	others	sexual	orientation.	The	exemptions	are	valid	responses	to	the	need	to	protect	the	autonomy	and	religious	freedom	rights	of	religious	organisations,	although	of	course	there	will	be	considerable	disagreement	on	their	appropriate	scope.		Within	the	context	of	religious	discriminatory	expression	within	the	workplace,	rather	than	 claims	 to	discriminate	by	 employees	 it	 is	 also	 very	difficult	 to	 see	 a	 hierarchy	of	rights	 (Pearson,	 2014).	 Rather	 these	 claims	 are	 highly	 context	 specific,	 although	 this	may	 be	 because	 these	 decisions	 have	 primarily	 been	 made	 at	 Employment	 Tribunal	level	and	therefore	there	is	little	general	guidance	available.	Some	cases	have	held	that	discriminatory	expression	can	be	prohibited.	In	Apelogun-Gabriels	v	Lambeth	((2006)	ET	2301976/05)	 an	 employee	 was	 dismissed	 because	 he	 distributed	 a	 document	 to	 his	
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colleagues	 which	 stated	 that,	 ‘sexual	 activity	 between	 members	 of	 the	 same	 sex	 is	universally	condemned’	and	 ‘male	homosexuality	 is	 forbidden	by	 law	and	punished	by	death’,	 following	 a	 prayer	 meeting	 at	 his	 place	 of	 work	 which	 took	 place	 with	 his	employer’s	 consent.	 Similarly	 in	 Haye	 v	 Lewisham	 ((2010)	 ET	 2301852/2009)	 an	employee	was	dismissed	when	she	sent	an	email	from	her	work	account	to	the	Lesbian	and	Gay	Christian	Movement	(LGCM).	In	it	she	stated	that	being	gay	is	a	sin,	that	LGCM	was	‘deceiving’	people	into	believing	that	it	was	acceptable	to	be	gay	and	a	Christian	and	urged	them	‘to	repent	and	turn	from	your	sinful	ways	before	[it’s]	too	late…	Hell	is	not	a	nice	place’.	In	both	cases	it	was	held	that	the	claimants	had	not	been	subjected	to	direct	or	indirect	discrimination	and	had	not	been	unfairly	dismissed.	It	has	also	been	held	that	dismissal	 for	 repeated	 attempts	 at	 proselytisation	 towards	 a	 more	 junior	 member	 of	staff,	 which	 did	 not	 involve	 any	 discriminatory	 speech,	 did	 not	 amount	 to	 unfair	dismissal.12		
However,	in	other	cases	it	has	been	held	that	discriminatory	religious	expression	is	not	a	sufficient	reason	for	disciplinary	action.	In	Smith	v	Trafford	Housing	Trust	([2012]	EWHC	3221	(Ch))	it	was	held	a	housing	manager	had	been	wrongfully	dismissed	when	he	was	demoted	 to	 a	 non-managerial	 position	 with	 a	 40%	 reduction	 in	 pay	 because	 of	comments	 he	 made	 on	 Facebook	 about	 civil	 partnerships	 in	 religious	 premises.	 He	posted	 a	 news	 article	 entitled,	 ‘Gay	 church	 ‘marriages’	 set	 to	 get	 the	 go-ahead’	 and	commented	 ‘an	 equality	 too	 far’.	 After	 a	 colleague	 replied	 ‘does	 this	 mean	 you	 don’t	approve?’	he	replied:	
No	 not	 really,	 I	 don’t	 understand	 why	 people	 who	 have	 no	 faith	 and	 don’t	 believe	 in	Christ	would	want	to	get	hitched	in	church	the	bible	is	quite	specific	that	marriage	is	for	men	and	women	if	the	state	wants	to	offer	civil	marriage	to	same	sex	then	that	is	up	to	the	state;	but	the	state	shouldn’t	impose	it’s	[sic]	rules	on	places	of	faith	and	conscience.13			Similarly	in	the	recent	case	of	Mbuyi	v	Newpark	Childcare,	((2015)	ET	3300656/2014)	a	nursery	assistant	was	alleged	to	have	said	to	a	colleague	‘Oh	my	God,	are	you	a	lesbian?’	(something	which	at	the	time	no	complaint	was	made	about)	and	a	number	of	months	later,	during	the	course	of	a	conversation	about	the	church	the	claimant	attended,	stated	that	 homosexuality	 was	 a	 sin.	 The	 tribunal	 held	 that	 dismissal	 for	 these	 reasons	amounted	to	direct	or	alternatively	indirect	religious	discrimination	because	it	relied	on	stereotypical	 assumptions	 about	 Evangelical	 Christianity	 and	 because	 she	 was	 asked	
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hostile	questions	about	her	beliefs,	rather	than	her	actions,	which	did	not	relate	to	the	specific	allegations	at	issue,	at	a	disciplinary	meeting.			These	varying	decisions	show	that	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	say	 that	 there	 is	a	hierarchy	of	rights	 in	 this	 context.	 Whether	 the	 expression	 is	 permissible	 will	 depend	 on	 the	offensiveness	of	the	speech	and	the	context	in	which	it	 is	made:	whether	it	takes	place	within	work	time,	whether	it	is	in	the	context	of	a	conversation	about	religious	matters	or	whether	it	is	the	result	of	active,	unwanted	proselytisation.			However,	while	in	the	majority	of	cases	there	are	alternative	explanations	which	do	not	depend	 on	 there	 being	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 rights	 within	 the	 Equality	 Act,	 one	 case	 does	strongly	suggest	 that	 religion	 there	was	undervalued	 in	comparison	 to	other	rights.	In	the	well	publicised	case	of	Eweida	v	British	Airways	([2010]	ICR	890)	a	member	of	BA’s	check	 in	 staff	 wished	 to	 wear	 a	 cross	 visibly	 while	 at	 work,	 which	 contravened	 BA’s	uniform	 policy.	 Her	 claim	 of	 indirect	 discrimination	 failed	 because	 it	 did	 not	 put	Christians	as	a	whole	or	an	‘identifiable	section	of	the	workforce’14	at	a	disadvantage.15	It	was	held	 that	 the	claimant	had	not	shown	herself	 to	be	a	member	of	a	group	that	had	been	disadvantaged	by	the	company’s	no	jewellery	policy	in	being	forbidden	to	wear	a	cross	 visibly	 as	 she	 was	 the	 only	 one	 in	 a	 workforce	 of	 30,000	 that	 had	 complained	about	the	policy.	This	was	an	extremely	narrow	and	unsatisfactory	analysis	of	 indirect	discrimination	 (Hatzis,	2011).	 It	 is	not	necessary	 for	 the	group	 that	a	 claimant	asserts	she	is	part	of	to	actually	exist	at	the	place	of	work.	To	require	this	would	hardly	break	down	 structural	 barriers	 at	 work,	 since	 it	 would	mean	 indirect	 discrimination	 claims	could	 not	 be	 brought	 where	 a	 policy	 was	 harsh	 enough	 to	 discourage	 members	 of	 a	particular	group	from	applying	for	employment	(Pitt,	2011).	Thus	in	Edwards	v	London	
Underground	([1998]	EWCA	Civ	877)	a	woman	could	claim	 indirect	sex	discrimination	where	she	could	not	work	a	shift	pattern	because	of	her	childcare	responsibilities.	It	did	not	matter	that	she	was	the	only	woman	who	had	complained	about	the	policy,	bearing	in	mind	that	very	few	women	worked	for	London	Underground	at	the	time	(only	21	out	of	a	workforce	of	2044)	and	that	in	the	population	at	large	women	were	more	likely	to	be	 disadvantaged	 by	 such	 a	 policy	 because	 they	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 childcare	responsibilities.	 It	 was	 therefore	 always	 possible	 for	 a	 pool	 of	 comparators	 to	 be	hypothetical	and	it	is	surprising	that	this	was	not	recognised	in	Eweida.		
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While	 this	was	a	highly	restrictive	 interpretation	of	 indirect	discrimination,	 this	was	a	relatively	 isolated	 case16	and	 later	 developments	 have	 ameliorated	 this	 problem.	 In	
Eweida	v	UK	([2013]	ECHR	37)	the	ECtHR	held	that	Eweida’s	treatment	amounted	to	a	contravention	 of	 Art	 9.	 Partly	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 gave	 a	 less	 restrictive	interpretation	of	 indirect	discrimination	 in	 the	 later	case	of	Mba	v	Merton	LBC	([2013]	EWCA	 Civ	 1562).	 Mba	 refused	 to	 work	 on	 a	 Sunday	 because	 of	 her	 Christian	 beliefs.	After	some	confusion	in	the	lower	courts	about	the	relevance	of	this	not	being	(as	they	saw	it)	a	core	belief	of	Christianity,	the	Court	of	Appeal	disavowed	this	reasoning.	It	held	that	 it	 was	 not	 necessary	 that	 all	 Christians	 or	 even	 a	majority	 refused	 to	work	 on	 a	Sunday	as	it	was	clear	that	some	Christians,	including	the	claimant,	refused	to	do	so.	It	is	however	remarkable	that	these	difficulties	for	the	claimants	arose	in	cases	which	hardly	involve	 entirely	 idiosyncratic	 beliefs.	 That	 some,	 although	 by	 no	means	 all	 or	 even	 a	majority	of	Christians,	wish	to	wear	a	cross	as	a	way	of	manifesting	their	faith	or	refuse	to	work	on	Sundays	 is	 fairly	well	known.	Nevertheless	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	extrapolate	from	them	a	conclusion	that	religion	is	treated	less	favourably	in	general.		
Is	a	hierarchy	of	rights	appropriate?		While	 these	 cases	do	not	 therefore	demonstrate	 a	hierarchy	of	 rights,	 a	 very	different	argument	has	been	made,	particularly	by	Aileen	McColgan,	(2009,	2014;	also	Lester	and	Uccellari	 2008)	 that	 religion	 is	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 the	 other	 protected	characteristics.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	 argued,	 artificially	 treating	 it	 the	 same	will	 affect	 the	whole	scheme	of	the	Equality	Act.	However,	even	if	it	is	justifiable	to	say	that	religion	is	different	 from	 the	 other	 protected	 characteristics,	 an	 assumption	 which	 will	 be	addressed	further	below,	these	fears	have	proved	to	be	unfounded.			A	principal	 part	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 that	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	unwanted	 results,	 religious	discrimination	 will	 be	 defined	 as	 indirect	 rather	 than	 direct	 so	 it	 can	 be	 justified,	following	 the	 normal	 position	 that	 direct	 discrimination	 is	 illegal	 unless	 a	 specific	exemption,	which	are	narrowly	interpreted,	applies.	It	is	argued	that	including	religion	would	 affect	 the	 traditional	 distinction	 between	 these	 concepts	 and	 lessen	 the	protection	 given	 by	 discrimination	 law	 overall.	 However,	 this	 redefinition	 does	 not	appear	to	have	occurred.			
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In	 R(E)	 v	 JFS	 ([2010]	 2	 AC	 728)	 a	 challenge	 was	 made	 to	 a	 Jewish	 faith	 school’s	admission	policy	on	the	basis	that	it	unlawfully	racially	discriminated.	JFS	gave	priority	to	children	who	were	regarded	as	Jewish	by	the	Office	of	the	Chief	Rabbi.	This	applied	a	matrilineal	 test:	 a	 person	 was	 regarded	 as	 Jewish	 if	 his	 mother	 was	 Jewish	 or	 had	converted	to	Judaism	through	Orthodox	auspices.	E	was	therefore	not	considered	to	be	Jewish,	 although	his	 father	was	 Jewish	 and	his	mother	had	 converted	 to	 Judaism	 (but	not	through	Orthodox	auspices)	and	the	family	followed	Jewish	religious	practices.	The	majority	of	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	the	policy	was	direct	race	discrimination.	It	 is	clear	 that	 Jews	 are	 an	 ethnic	 group,17	and	 so	 a	 test	 based	 on	 descent	 from	 a	 Jewish	mother	 must	 be	 direct	 race	 discrimination.	 It	 is	 a	 foundational	 principle	 of	 English	discrimination	law	that	a	subjective	intention	to	discriminate	is	not	necessary.18	Indeed,	it	is	no	defence	that	a	person	may	have	acted	from	the	best	of	motives.	It	was	therefore	irrelevant	 that	 the	 test	 applied	 was	 for	 sincere	 religious	 reasons	 and	 could	 not	 be	described	 as	 ‘racist’	 in	 any	 usual	 sense.	 The	majority	 therefore	 resisted	 calls	 to	 alter	established	jurisprudence	and	to	 ‘allow	the	result	to	dictate	the	reasoning’.19	To	decide	this	case	the	other	way	(as	did	the	court	at	first	instance,	and	four	of	the	nine	members	of	 the	 Supreme	 Court)	 would	 have	 weakened	 discrimination	 law.	 As	 Lord	 Phillips	suggested,	permitting	discrimination	in	these	circumstances	would	have	to	be	a	matter	for	Parliament	and	a	legislative	exemption.	In	addition	to	not	disrupting	the	distinction	between	direct	and	indirect	discrimination,	it	is	also	noticeable	that	neither	this	case	nor	any	 other	 has	 led	 to	 any	 clear	 demand	 to	 introduce	 a	 general	 justification	 defence	 to	direct	 discrimination	 claims;	 an	 alternative	 concern	 raised	 about	 the	 inclusion	 of	religion	as	a	protected	characteristic	(Pitt,	2011).		Whilst	 JFS	gave	 the	 correct	 reading	of	 the	Equality	Act,	 this	 analysis	 is	not	without	 its	problems.	 Requiring	 JFS	 to	 change	 its	 policy	 may	 well	 be	 considered	 appropriate	 by	many	given	that	it	concerned	admissions	criteria	to	a	state	funded	school.	However,	this	decision	 evidently	 applies	 outside	 this	 specific	 context.	 As	 described	 above	 there	 are	exemptions	for	employment	which	is	for	the	purposes	of	an	organised	religion	but	these	do	not	apply	 to	 race	discrimination.	Applying	a	 test	of	 Jewishness	which	depended	on	matrilineal	 descent	 would	 therefore	 be	 impermissible	 race	 discrimination	 even	 for	centrally	 religious	 roles.	 However,	 to	 not	 permit	 a	 religion	 to	 define	 religious	membership	 for	 its	own	 internal	purposes	would	be	 to	 interfere	with	 the	very	core	of	religious	 autonomy.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 court’s	 decision	 was	 still	 correct.	 Rather	 than	
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changing	the	scheme	of	discrimination	law	by	defining	this	as	indirect	rather	than	direct	discrimination,	 the	 proper	 reaction	 to	 such	 a	 problem	 would	 be	 to	 have	 a	 specific	exemption	 dealing	 with	 this	 situation,	 although	 the	 scope	 and	 wording	 of	 such	 an	exemption	would	be	inevitably	difficult	and	controversial.	Probably	because	there	have	not	been	any	such	claims	brought	within	employment,	there	have	not	been	any	moves	to	introduce	a	specific	exemption.			
JFS	therefore	does	not	demonstrate	a	weakening	of	 the	distinction	between	direct	and	indirect	discrimination.	McColgan	(2009	and	2014)	also	has	pointed	to	Azmi	v	Kirklees	
MBC	([2007]	ICR	1154)	as	an	example.	Azmi	was	a	teaching	assistant,	who	worked	with	children	who	did	not	speak	English	as	their	first	language.	She	was	Muslim	and	wished	to	 be	 able	 to	 wear	 a	 full	 face	 veil	 while	 working	 unless	 this	 was	 with	 only	 female	teachers,	but	the	school	forbade	her	from	doing	so.	It	was	held	this	was	indirect	rather	than	direct	discrimination	and	could	be	 justified.	The	tribunal	accepted	that	 it	was	not	possible	 for	 her	 to	 only	work	with	 female	 teachers	 as	 all	 the	 children	were	 taught	 by	some	 male	 teachers	 and	 that	 she	 was	 not	 as	 effective	 in	 communicating	 with	 and	teaching	 the	 children	 if	 they	 could	 not	 see	 her	 face.	 It	 was	 not	 direct	 discrimination	because	she	would	have	been	treated	in	the	same	way	had	she	wished	to	cover	her	face	for	a	reason	unrelated	to	her	religious	beliefs.			McColgan	argues	that	the	conclusion	that	this	is	not	direct	discrimination	is	inconsistent	with	the	treatment	of	pregnancy	discrimination	as	direct	sex	discrimination.	As	the	ECJ	put	it	in	Dekker	v	Stiching,	(C-177/88,	[1990]	ECR	I-34941)	‘Only	women	can	be	refused	employment	on	the	ground	of	pregnancy	and	such	a	refusal	therefore	constitutes	direct	discrimination	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 sex.’20	McColgan’s	 argument	 is	 that	 in	 reality	 only	Muslim	 women	 are	 likely	 to	 want	 to	 cover	 their	 face	 while	 working	 and	 so	 this	 is	analogous	 to	 pregnancy	 discrimination	 being	 sex	 discrimination.	 The	 inclusion	 of	pregnancy	as	direct	sex	discrimination	was	an	important	advance	for	women’s	inclusion	in	 the	 workplace.	 It	 prevented	 employers	 from	 arguing	 that	 it	 was	 not	 sex	discrimination	 if	 they	 would	 have	 dismissed	 an	 employee	 who	 would	 have	 been	similarly	 absent	 for	 ill	 health	 or	 from	 allowing	 them	 to	 justify	 their	 treatment	 of	pregnant	women	based	on	economic	considerations.			
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Nevertheless	pregnancy	and	veiling	for	religious	reasons	are	not	comparable	situations.	While	it	may	be	difficult	to	think	of	an	example	of	why	someone	may	wish	to	cover	their	face	apart	 from	because	of	 their	Muslim	beliefs,	 there	 is	not	 the	 intrinsic	 link	between	being	female	and	being	pregnant,	even	though	of	course	not	all	women	are	pregnant,	or	even	 can	 become	 pregnant.	 Treating	 this	 as	 direct	 discrimination	 would	 also	 create	inconsistencies	in	another	sense.	If	an	employer	had	a	rule	that	hair	must	be	uncovered	at	work,	this	would	place	Muslim	women	who	wished	to	wear	a	hijab	at	a	disadvantage	compared	to	others	and	thus	be	indirect	discrimination.	However,	it	is	quite	possible	to	think	of	other	groups	who	may	wish	to	wear	head-coverings,	for	non-religious	as	well	as	religious	reasons.	This	cannot	 therefore	be	direct	discrimination.	But	 to	 treat	covering	the	 face	 as	 direct	 discrimination	 but	 wearing	 a	 headscarf	 as	 indirect	 discrimination	would	 be	 extremely	 odd,	 particularly	 bearing	 in	mind	 that	 there	 is	 likely	 to	 be	more	justification	 for	 restricting	 the	 first	 but	 not	 the	 second.	 Contrary	 then	 to	 McColgan’s	argument,	 Azmi	does	 not	 therefore	 show	 any	 narrowing	 of	 the	 direct	 discrimination	concept	but	is	an	orthodox	application	of	it.	Practically	also,	treating	pregnancy	as	part	of	 sex	 discrimination	 is	 firmly	 established,	 and	 pregnancy	 is	 now	 also	 a	 protected	characteristic	 in	 its	own	right	 in	 the	Equality	Act.	Even	 if	Azmi	were	 inconsistent	with	the	treatment	of	pregnancy	discrimination,	the	treatment	of	pregnancy	discrimination	is	highly	unlikely	to	be	altered.		Another	context	where	it	could	be	argued	that	the	inclusion	of	religion	or	belief	may	or	will	 alter	 established	 concepts,	 is	 in	 the	 broadening	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 indirect	discrimination	 and	 its	 lost	 relationship	with	 group	 disadvantage	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 its	coherence.	As	described	above,	 the	phrase	 ‘put	or	would	put	persons	with	whom	[the	claimant]	 shares	 the	 characteristic	 at	 a	 disadvantage’ 21 	was	 initially	 interpreted	restrictively	 in	the	religious	context	 in	Eweida	v	British	Airways	but	this	reasoning	was	disapproved	of	 in	Eweida	v	UK	by	the	ECJ	and	later	disavowed	by	the	English	courts	in	
Mba.	This	means,	given	the	subjective	and	variable	nature	of	religious	belief,	and	even	more	so	of	non-religious	beliefs,	 that	 it	 is	 theoretically	possible	 for	 the	group	who	has	been	 disadvantaged	 to	 be	 a	 group	 of	 one.	 While	 this	 does	 lessen	 the	 link	 between	indirect	 discrimination	 and	 group	disadvantage,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 this	 amounts	 to,	 if	anything,	more	than	a	slight	shift	in	emphasis.	The	group	the	claimant	argued	had	been	disadvantaged	and	 that	 she	was	a	member	of	 could	always	be	hypothetical	within	 the	
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workforce.	Even	applying	an	entirely	orthodox	analysis,	it	should	not	have	mattered	that	Eweida	was	the	only	one	out	of	the	workforce	to	make	a	complaint	about	the	policy.		
Is	religion	different	from	other	protected	characteristics?		While	 the	 risks	 put	 forward	 by	 McColgan	 and	 others	 resulting	 from	 the	 inclusion	 of	religion	have	not	therefore	materialised,	there	is	a	more	foundational	problem	with	the	argument.	 The	 critique	 rests	 to	 some	 extent	 on	 a	 view	 that	 religion	 is	 different	 from	other	 protected	 characteristics.	 A	 couple	 of	 reasons	 have	 been	 put	 forward	 for	 this.	Firstly,	as	Sedley	LJ	stated	in	Eweida	v	British	Airways,		 ‘one	cannot	help	observing	that	all	of	these	[characteristics]	apart	from	religion	or	belief	are	objective	characteristics	of	individuals;	 religion	 and	 belief	 alone	 are	 matters	 of	 choice’.22	This	 though	 this	 is	 an	unsatisfactory	answer.	It	fails	to	take	an	internal	view	of	religion	(McCrudden,	2011)	as	few	believers	would	define	their	religion	in	this	way.	Moreover,	to	describe	it	in	this	way	implies	that	religion	is	a	relatively	unimportant	consumer	choice.	It	fails	to	describe	why	religion	may	be	so	 important	 to	 individuals	 (Vickers,	2010).	While	 there	may	be	some	who	 do	 perceive	 their	 religion	 in	 this	 way,	 and	 the	 ‘marketplace	 of	 religion’	 may	 be	increasing,	 (Hunt,	2005)	 this	understanding	of	 the	nature	of	 religious	belief	 cannot	be	taken	to	be	representative	(Bacquet,	2015;	Edge,	2000).		A	 further	 argument	 is	 that	 religion	 is	 different	 because	 it	 (tends	 to)	 place	 extensive	requirements	for	behaviour	onto	believers.	In	particular,	these	obligations	may	require	believers	 to	 discriminate	 against	 others	 and	 therefore	 create	 conflict	 between	 rights	(Lester	and	Uccellari,	2008).	Unlike	other	protected	characteristics	like	race,	religion	or	belief	is	not	merely	a	status,	in	that	a	person	is	a	Christian	or	a	Muslim,	but	a	reason	for	acting	 in	 a	 particular	 way.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 differences	 between	 religion	 and	 other	protected	 characteristics	 can	 be	 overstated	 in	 this	 respect.	 In	 a	 direct	 discrimination	claim	religion	is	merely	a	status,	in	the	same	way	as	any	other	protected	characteristic:	a	person	is	discriminated	against	not	because	of	any	particular	action	they	have	taken	or	its	effect	on	the	workplace,	but	merely	because	they	are,	for	example	a	Christian.	It	is	in	indirect	discrimination	claims	that	it	could	be	argued	there	is	the	most	difference,	since	by	 being	 about	 requests	 to	 accommodate	 behaviour	 engaged	 in	 for	 religious	 reasons,	religious	 claims	 may	 require	 the	 modification	 of	 workplace	 rules.	 This	 does	 not	demonstrate	 though	 that	 religion	 is	 necessarily	 different	 from	 other	 protected	
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characteristics.	 Indirect	 discrimination	 claims	 are	 inherently	 about	 challenging	seemingly	 neutral	 rules.	 There	 is	 little	 structural	 difference	 between	 a	 sex	discrimination	claim	arguing	 that	a	particular	shift	pattern	 is	 indirectly	discriminatory	because	women	are	more	likely	to	have	childcare	responsibilities	and	therefore	less	able	to	 comply	 with	 it	 and	 a	 religious	 discrimination	 claim	 arguing	 that	 a	 requirement	 to	work	 on	 Friday	 lunchtime	 is	 indirect	 discrimination	 against	 Muslims.	 While	accommodating	religion	in	this	way	may	well	impose	burdens	on	employers	and	others,	again	 this	 is	 not	 unique	 to	 religion.	 Much	 of	 the	 point	 of	 discrimination	 law	 is	 to	challenge	established	practices	that	may	lead	to	exclusion	or	disadvantage.	The	burden	on	employers	 is	 in	 any	 case	 likely	 to	be	higher	with	pregnancy	and	disability	but	 it	 is	accepted	that	it	is	right	to	prohibit	discrimination	on	these	grounds.			The	 fact	 that	 religious	 beliefs	 may	 conflict	 with	 other	 protected	 characteristics,	including	 the	 religious	 beliefs	 of	 others,	 sexual	 orientation	 and	 potentially	 race	 and	disability	 (Elias	 and	 Coppel,	 2001)	 is	 however	 a	 relevant	 difference.	 This	 issue	 will	though	 mainly	 arise	 in	 the	 context	 of	 indirect	 discrimination	 claims	 where	 religious	employees	 are	 seeking	 to	 be	 accommodated	 in	 their	 religious	 beliefs.	 Concerns	 about	the	 rights	 of	 others	 can	 therefore	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 at	 the	 justification	 stage	 in	indirect	 discrimination	 claims,	 in	 addition	 to	 considering	 the	 employer’s	 interests	 in	terms	 of	 practicality,	 the	 interests	 of	 other	 employees	 and	 so	 on.	 While	 claims	 may	therefore	 be	more	 complex,	 this	 does	 not	make	 the	 claim	wholly	 different	 from	other	indirect	discrimination	claims.		Furthermore,	excluding	religion	 from	the	Equality	Act	would	 lead	 to	gaps	 in	coverage.	As	McColgan	herself	makes	 clear,	 there	 are	 clear	 links	between	 religion	 and	ethnicity.	There	has	been	a	rise	in	Islamophobia	and	anti-Muslim	sentiment,	(Ogan	et	al,	2013)	but	for	 the	 purposes	 of	 discrimination	 law	 it	 has	 been	 held	 that	 Muslims	 per	 se	 do	 not	constitute	an	ethnic	group,	given	the	highly	varied	backgrounds	of	adherents.23	To	fail	to	protect	 Muslims	 from	 stereotypical	 and	 discriminatory	 attitudes	 within	 the	 sphere	covered	by	discrimination	 law	would	evidently	 fail	 to	address	 structural	disadvantage	within	society.			Pitt	(2010)	has	argued	that	protection	should	be	left	to	Article	9	ECHR,	coupled	with	a	broader	understanding	of	cultural	or	ethnic	discrimination,	because	claims	are	primarily	
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about	 religious	 freedom	 rather	 than	 discrimination.	 It	 is	 not	 so	 easy	 though	 to	distinguish	between	the	two.	Freedom	tends	to	be	restricted	unequally.	Indeed	what	the	majority	may	not	even	perceive	as	a	restriction	of	freedom	because	they	have	no	wish	to	do	the	prohibited	act,	may	be	perceived	very	differently	by	a	minority	group.	There	are	also	 practical	 problems.	 Confining	 protection	 to	 Art	 9	 would	 create	 problems	 for	claimants	particularly	in	the	employment	context	since	they	would	not	be	able	to	bring	claims	alleging	a	breach	of	Art	9	to	an	Employment	Tribunal,	which	is	at	least	in	theory,	a	faster,	cheaper	and	more	informal	method	of	ensuring	redress	than	the	court	system.	It	 is	 also	 unclear	 what	 the	 benefits	 would	 be	 of	 such	 a	 policy.	 To	 withdraw	 detailed	legislation	on	some	points,	for	example	when	religious	organisations	can	discriminate	in	employment	 would	 cause	 confusion	 and	 be	 detrimental	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 both	religion	 and	 other	 rights.	 In	 other	 contexts	which	 are	 not	 so	 clearly	 delineated	 in	 the	legislation,	 such	 as	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 person’s	 religious	 beliefs	 should	 be	accommodated	at	work,	the	courts	would	still	have	to	make	difficult	decisions	about	the	boundaries	of	the	right,	particularly	where	rights	conflict.	In	fact	the	test	itself	would	be	very	 similar.	 Under	 both	 Art	 9	 and	 indirect	 discrimination	 claims,	 there	 is	 a	proportionality	 test	 which	 involves	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 others.	 It	 is	therefore	unclear	what	the	benefit	would	be.	To	exclude	religion	from	the	Equality	Act	would	be	a	retrograde	step	for	equality	law.		
Conclusion		This	article	began	by	highlighting	two	critiques	of	the	treatment	of	religion:	firstly	that	religion	 had	 been	 undervalued,	 and	 secondly	 that	 it	 was	 inappropriate	 to	 include	religion	 because	 of	 its	 differences	 to	 other	 protected	 characteristics.	 Neither	 of	 these	arguments	have	been	made	out.	In	relation	to	the	first,	while	there	may	have	been	a	less	sympathetic	approach	to	religious	claims	made	under	equality	legislation	in	a	few	cases,	a	 far	 more	 nuanced	 interpretation	 is	 necessary.	 Religion	 or	 belief	 has	 not	 been	systemically	 undervalued.	As	 to	 the	 second,	 the	 dangers	 highlighted	by	 this	 argument	have	 not	 materialised.	 There	 have	 not	 been	 major	 reinterpretations	 of	 established	concepts	 in	the	Equality	Act.	While	this	article	therefore	sounds	a	positive	note,	 this	 is	not	wholly	unqualified.	This	is	a	controversial,	fast-moving	and	complex	area	of	law.	The	inclusion	of	religion	 in	the	Equality	Act	will	continue	to	pose	challenges	and	cases	will	
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continue	 to	 arise.	 There	 is	 on-going	 work	 to	 be	 done	 in	 articulating	 the	 appropriate	boundary	of	the	right.																																																												
Notes		1	Although	they	did	give	her	the	option	of	transferring	jobs	or	of	only	requiring	her	to	administer	the	simple	signing	of	the	register	rather	than	performing	full	ceremonies.		2	Equality	Act	2010	s.13.	The	test	at	the	time	referred	to	‘on	the	ground	of’	rather	than	‘because	of’	but	this	change	in	terminology	was	not	meant	to	have	any	substantive	effect.		3	Equality	Act	2010	s.19.	4	Both	cases	arose	before	the	Marriage	(Same	Sex	Couples)	Act	2013,	although	Hall	and	Preddy	were	in	a	civil	partnership.	5	Catholic	Care	(Diocese	of	Leeds)	v	Charity	Commission	for	England	and	Wales	[2012]	UKUT	395	(TCC).	Although	see	the	different	decision	made	by	the	Scottish	Charity	Appeals	Panel	in	St	Margaret’s	Children	and	Family	Care	Society	App	2/13	(31	Jan	2013).	6	Although	see	Pemberton	v	Inwood,	Acting	Bishop	of	Southwell	and	Nottingham	(2015)	ET	2600962/2014	where	it	was	held	that	it	was	not	unlawful	for	the	Bishop	to	refuse	to	give	a	licence	required	for	the	claimant	to	take	up	an	NHS	chaplaincy	post	because	he	had	married	his	male	partner.		7	Equality	Act	Schedule	9	para	2.	8	The	Equality	Act	(Sexual	Orientation)	Regulations	2007	otherwise	came	into	force	on	30th	April	2007.	9	Equality	Act	2010	Schedule	9	para	2	10	The	employer	must	still	demonstrate	that	‘having	regard	to	[the	religious]	ethos	and	to	the	nature	or	context	of	the	work’	being	of	a	particular	religion	or	belief	is	an	occupational	requirement	and	a	proportionate	means	of	achieving	a	legitimate	aim’.	Equality	Act	2010	Schedule	9	para	3.		11	Specifically	it	may	restrict:	‘membership	of	the	organisation,	participation	in	activities	undertaken	by	the	organisation	or	on	its	behalf	or	under	its	auspices;	the	provision	of	goods,	facilities	or	services	in	the	course	of	activities	undertaken	by	the	organisation	or	on	its	behalf	or	under	its	auspices;	or	the	use	or	disposal	of	premises	owned	or	controlled	by	the	organisation.’	Equality	Act	2010	Schedule	23	para	2.	12	Wasteney	v	East	London	NHS	Foundation	Trust	3200658/2014.	13	[2012]	EWHC	3221	(Ch)	at	para	4.	14	[2010]	ICR	890,	896.	15	Direct	discrimination	may	also	have	been	relevant	because	other	religious	symbols	such	as	the	Sikh	turban	were	permitted.		16	That	is	in	so	far	as	religious	discrimination	cases	under	the	Equality	Act	go.	There	were	greater	problems	with	cases	brought	under	Art	9	ECHR,	as	for	example	in	
R(Begum)	v	Denbigh	High	School	[2007]	1	AC	100	where	it	was	held	that	there	was	no	
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																																																																																																																																																														interference	with	the	claimant’s	rights	when	she	was	prohibited	from	wearing	a	jilbab	to	school	as	there	were	other	schools	she	could	attend.	See	Pearson	(2013).	17	Seide	v	Gillette	Industries	Ltd	[1980]	IRLR	427.	18	See	eg	James	v	Eastleigh	BC	[1990]	2	AC	751.		19	JFS	[2010]	2	AC	728	at	para	70	(Baroness	Hale).	20	Quoted	in	McColgan	(2014):	157.	21	Equality	Act	2010	s.19.		22	See	also	Schiek	(2002).	23	Nzayi	v	Rymans	EAT	[1988]	6/88.		
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